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ABSTRACT
Thispaper, prepared for the annual meetings of the American Economic
Association, discusses how the increases in the U.S. budget deficits since
1980 have affected the economies of Western Europe. The analysis emphasizes
that U.S. deficits have not only affected these economies directly but have
also induced them to adopt more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies than
they would otherwise have chosen. This induced shift in domestic policies is
the primary reason why European governments have pressed for a reduction in





Cairbridge, W 02138U.S. Budget Deficits and the European Economies:
Resolving the Political Economy Puzzle
Martin Feldstein*
The .xperience of the past five years has dramatically underscoredthe
international consequences of U.S. fiscal policy. The massivecurrent and
projected budget deficits were the primary cause of the sharp 60—pluspercent
rise in the real trade-weighted value of the dollar between1980 and the end
of 1984. The dollar's rise was -in turn the majorreason that the U.S. current
account shifted from a surplus in 1981 to an unprecedented deficit that
currently exceeds 3 percent of GNP.1
During the past four years, the exploding trade deficit has generated
calls in the United States to adopt protectionist policies andto abandon our
basic system of floating exchange rates. At the same time,European policy
officials have been unanimous in calling upon the United States to reduce-its
budget deficit and to cooperate in -intervention to lower the doiiar!s value.
The anguished cries from American exporters and from American firmsand
employees that compete with imports from abroad are easy to understand. But
why have European officials been critical of our fiscal policy andeager to
see the dollar decline? Hasn't the U.S. trade deficit meant a substantial
*professor of Economics, Harvard University and President of theNational
Bureau of Economic Research. This paper will be presented at the annual
meetings of the American Economic Association on December 29, 1985 in the
session on The International Dimensions of Fiscal Policies.I am grateful to
Rudiger Dornbusch, Jeffrey Frankel, Paul Krugman and Jeffrey Sachs for
conversations on this subject over the past severalyears in both Washington
and Cambridge. A more complete discussion of the impact of U.S. deficitson
German unemployment will appear in Feldstein and Bacchetta (1986). Earlier
comments along these lines were published in Feldstein (1985).
1For a discussion of the links between thebudget deficit, the dollar and
the trade deficit, see Chapter 3 of the 1983 and 1984 editions of theEconomic
Report of the President.—2—
improvement in the European trade balances? And shouldn't that have been the
mechanism by which the U.S. "locomotive" (to use a currently unpopular phrase)
pulled the European economies out of their recession? The European complaints
about U.S. fiscal policy and about the resulting strong dollar are a
political economy puzzle that deserves to be addressed.
There is no doubt that the European trade balances have improved. For
the European Economic Community (EEC) as a whole, the trade balance with the
rest of the world improved by more than $50 billion between 1980 and 1984.
Exports rose sharply. French and German exports both increased about 17
percent between 1980 and 1984 and have continued to expand rapidly in 1985.
Nevertheless, during the past four years, growth in the European community
languished at an average annual rate of less than one percent and the
unemployment rate has doubled.
It is of course possible that the rise in European unemployment and the
slow growth in Europe would have been even worse without the strong U.S.
dollar and our resulting trade deficit. If so, the vociferous complaints of
European officials are simply the normal behaviour of politicians seeking to
shift the blame for domestic policy failures to a convenient scapegoat. But I
think that there is a more serious and legitimate reason why the Europeans
have been critical of our fiscal policy.
In considering the impact of recent U.S. fiscal policy on the European
economies, it is important to bear three things in mind. First, budget policy
is only one aspect of the change in U.S. economic policy that has occurred
since 1980. The increased budget deficits were accompanied by a monetary
policy that caused U.S. inflation to decline from 9 percent in 1980 and 1981
to 4 percent in each year since 1982. Thus a sound monetary policy and the-3-
expectation that such a policy would persist prevented the massive budget
deficits from leading to concurrent inflation or to a widespreadexpectation
of future inflation.2 In addition, business tax rules were changed in 1981 in
a way that reinforced the effect of the budget deficits on real interest
rates .3
Second, U.S. policies affect the European economies not only directly
through trade and financial markets but also by inducing changes in the
policies of European governments. These induced policy changes have been
particularly important in the past few years and go a long way toward
explaining why European officials believe that their countries have been hurt
by U.S. fiscal policies despite the favorable effects on European exports.
Third, although it is possible to generalize considerably about the impact
of U.S. policy on the European economies, it is also important to recognize
that the situation differs among the major countries. I will focusmy
comments on the situation in Germany, not only because Germany is the largest
of the European nations, with nearly 30 percent of the EEC's total GDP, but
because it is also the dominant nation in the European Monetary System and the
primary trading partner of the other European nations. The impact of the U.S.
deficits on the German economy and particularly on German economic policy
therefore had profound effects elsewhere in Europe.
2This gives a bit too much credit to monetary policy for the decline in
U.S. inflation. The interaction of monetary and budget policy, by raising the
exchange value of the dollar, was an important cause of reduced inflation. See
Sachs (1985).
3See Feldstein (1976, 1980) for an early discussion of thelikely impact
of such tax reform on real interest rates and Feldsteiri (1986) for evidence
that the enlarged budget deficits had a much bigger impact on interest rates
than the change in tax rules.—4-
I. The Direct Impact of U.S. Fiscal Policy
The strong U.S. economic recovery and the surge in the U.S. dollar
undoubtedly contributed to a significant rise in European exports to the
United States. Since 1980, U.S. imports from Western Europe increased more
than 50 percent while the value of our exports to those countries has actually
declined. But the importance of this to Europe should not be exaggerated. The
U.S. represents less than 10 percent of the imports and exports of the EEC
countries; even when intra-EEC trade is eliminated, the U.S. is only one-sixth
of EEC trade. In fact, the total volume of exports of the EEC rose only 14
percent between 1980 and 1984, about one-third less than the increase in the
two previous four-year periods.
The sharp rise in the dollar relative to the European currencies also had
two unfavorable direct effects. It caused a decline in the terms of trade
with the United States (and with other countries whose currencies followed the
dollar more closely than the ECU) and it put upward pressure on domestic
inflation in Europe. The German mark fell 45 percent in real terms relative
to the dollar between 1980 and the end of 1984, implying that German exports
to the U.S. bought 45 percent less in U.S. goods in 1984 than they did in
1980. Since U.S. trade represents 8 percent of Germany's GOP, this
corresponds to a real income fall of about 3 percent.
The impact of the dollar's rise on European inflation is more difficult
to judge because of the induced policy response to which I will turn in a
moment. But a simple mechanical pass-through of the increased import costs
associated with the 70 percent nominal rise in the dollar-DM ratio between
1980 and the end of 1984 would imply a 6 percent increase in the German price—5—
level or about one-third of the actual price rise over that 4 year period.
This cost pass-through calculation is very crude. It understates the
inflationary effect to the extent that it ignores imports priced in dollars
that do not come from the United States and because it ignores the impact of
rising import prices on domestic prices and wages.
The increase in U.S. real long-term interest rates raised not only the
value of the dollar but also the level of real long-term interest rates in
Europe. This increase in interest rates reflected in part the policy response
of the Bundesbank and other central banks that I will discuss in a moment.
But even with no change in European economic policy, the behavior of private
investors would have caused the real long-term interest rates on DPI and other
long-term bonds to move in the same direction as the real interest rate on
dollar bonds. The rise in the real long-term interest rate in Germany reduced
spending on construction and on investment in plant and equipment, industries
in which the decline in activity and increase in unemployment have been
particularly severe.
This impact of U.S. long-term rates on European investment can also be
expressed in terms of the shift in the capital flow with the rest of the
world. Germany, which was importing capital to finance a current account
deficit in 1980, had a current account surplus in 1984 equal to more than 5
percent of gross fixed investment. For 1985, the current account surplus and
associated capital outflow is expected to reach more than 10 percent of gross
fixed investment. Europeans complain that this not only represents a fall in
activity in the investment sector but also, by keeping the capital stock
smaller than it would otherwise have been, retards the growth of productivity-6-
and therefore exacerbates the classical unemployment problem caused by wage
demands in excess of full—employment productivity.
It is difficult to be confident about the net impact on employment and
output of the several direct effects of the U.S. fiscal deficits. The
positive impact of the expanded exports may, but need not, exceed the adverse
effects of the higher real interest rates and capital outflow. But these
direct effects are only part of the total impact of U.S. fiscal policy. The
large and persistent U.S. budget deficits also caused the European countries
to alter their monetary and budget policies in a contractionary way. To
understand the impact of U.S. deficits on European economic activity, it is
important to examine the nature of these induced changes in economic policy.
II. The Induced Policy Response
Inflation was a principal problem on the minds of policy officials
everywhere in Europe as the 1980s began. The rise in the inflation rate after
the 1973 oil shock had just been slowly but painfully reversed when the 1979
oil shock restarted the inflation process. Inflation in the EEC as a whole
rose from 6.9 percent for 1978 to 12.4 percent for 1980. The Germans saw
inflation rise from 2.6 percent for 1978 to 5.3 percent for 1980. The German
government was determined to reverse this inflation, even if it meant
temporarily slower growth and increased unemployment.
The sharp rise in the dollar that began in 1980 brought with it an
additional inflationary impulse: a 20 percent decline in the mark between 1980
and 1981. To limit the future decline in the mark, the Bundesbank slowed the
growth of money and raised short-term interest rates. The German money supply—7—
actually declined between 1980 and 1981. The mark nevertheless continued to
fall. To offset the resulting inflationary pressure, the Bundesbankappears
to have continued to manage monetary policy in a way that maintainedgreater
slack in he German economy than they would otherwise have preferred.Money
supply growth from 1980 to 1983 was approximately half of what it had been in
the three preceding three-year periods and real GNP grew at anaverage annual
rate of less than one percent. This contraction of German monetary policy in
reaction to the rise of the dollar caused by U.S. budget deficits was an
important source of continued high unemployment in Germany and elsewhere in
Europe.
All of this can be restated more formally as follows: the decline in the
mark that resulted from the rising U.S. budget deficits was a negative supply
shock to the German economy that shifted its short-run Phillips curve to the
right. The Bundesbank pursued a tight money policy aimed at limiting this
shift and, to the extent that the shift could not be prevented, at moving
along the Phillips curve to achieve lower inflation than would otherwise occur
but at the cost of higher unemployment.
The enlarged U.S. budget deficits also appear to have caused German
fiscal policy to become more contractionary. This occurred for several
reasons. When the combination of high German interest rates and a slack
economy automatically enlarged the budget deficit, the German government
sought to counter this by cutting spending and allowing tax receipts to rise
as a share of income. It was also argued that shrinking the German budget
deficit would reduce inflationary pressure in Germany, would lower real
interest rates (including those paid by the government), and would free up—8-
funds to offset the capital outflow.
These remarks are not meant as either praise or criticism of German
monetary and fiscal policy since 1980.I want only to indicate how the
enlarged U.S. budget deficits, by raising real U.S. interest rates and thereby
reducing European currency values, induced the German government to adopt
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. Because of Germany's dominant
position in the European Monetary System, the other countries of Europe had to
follow Germany's tight money policy.4 Moreover, because half of European
trade is within the EEC and Germany is the largest EEC market for each of the
other member countries, the slowdown in German economic activity was
immediately transferred throughout Europe.
III. The Falling Dollar
The fall of the dollar that began in March 1985 opened new opportunities
for Germany and the other European countries. The dollar fell from 3.4 marks
at its peak to 2.8 marks in September (before the G-5 announcement on
coordinated intervention) and to less than 2.6 marks by the beginning of
December. Parallel shifts occurred in the values of the other EMS currencies.
The preceding analysis suggests that Germany and the other EEC countries
would respond to this dollar decline by easing monetary policy. That is
exactly what occurred. Although German money market rates were at essentially
the same level in March 1985 as they had been at the start of 1984 (despite a
100 basis point decline in comparable U.S. rates and a significant decline in
4This induced shift of national monetary policies in response to U.S.
fiscal deficits is the explanation of the rise in world—wide interest rates
that puzzled Summers and Blanchard (1984). Knight and Masson (1985) indicate
that a substantial rise in world-wide interest rates can also be ascribed to
the net fiscal expansion that occurred in the world economy as U.S. deficits
increased by more than European deficits declined. The fall in the OPEC
surplus reinforced this net decline in world-wide savings.—9-
German inflation), during the six months after the dollar began to decline
German interest rates came down 150 basis points, widening the gap with U.S.
rates. The response was similar in other EMS countries: money market rates
have declined 150 basis points in France and Italy. Longer term rates have
also generally declined.
The G-5 decision to try to bring the dollar down by coordinated
intervention has started yet another new phase. Although the Japanese have
strengthened the yen more than 15 percent by a sharp tightening of monetary
policy and by increasing the likelihood of fiscal expansion, the Germans and
other key European governments have only engaged in limited intervention
without any noticeable shift in monetary or fiscal policies. The more modest
strengthening of their currencies relative to the dollar since September has
reflected a continuation of the trend started earlier in the year, accelerated
by the market's fear of possible intervention and perhaps by the growing
recognition that the dollar remains too high to decline only at a rate equal
to the international interest differential (Krugman, 1985).
The strengthening of the European currencies relative to the dollar
replaces imported inflation with imported disinflation. In this environment,
the European governments can more easily pursue expansionary monetary
policies. This opportunity will be reinforced if prospective U.S. budget
deficits and long-term interest rates continue to decline. Although such an
easing of European monetary policy cannot be a substitute for dealing with the
more fundamental problems that prevent a return to full employment in Europe,





Blanchard, Olivier and Lawrence Summers, "Perspectives on High World Real
Interest Rates," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:1984, 273—324.
Feidstein, Martin, "Inflation, Income Taxes and the Rate of Interest: A
Theoretical Analysis," American Economic Review, December 1976, 66,
809-820.
__________"TaxRules and the Mismanagement of Monetary Policy," American
Economic Review, May 1980, 70, 182-186.
__________"AmericanEconomic Policy and the World Economy," Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1985, 63, 995-1008.
__________"BudgetDeficits, Tax Rules and Real Interest Rates," 1986,
forthcoming.
__________andBacchetta, Philippe, "U.S. Budget Deficits and European
Unemployment: The German Experience," 1986, forthcoming.
Knight, Malcolm and Paul R. Masson (1985), "Fiscal Policies, Net Savings and
Real Exchange Rates: The United States, Japan and the Federal Republic
of Germany," paper presented to a National Bureau of Economic Research
conference on International Aspects of Fiscal Policies, December 1985.
Krugman, Paul, "Is the Strong Dollar Sustainable?" NBER Working Paper
No. 1644, 1985.
Sachs, Jeffrey, "The Dollar and the Policy Mix: 1985," NBER Working
Paper No. 1636, 1985, and forthcoming in the Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity.